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I 
INTRODUCTION  
When a state invokes a right to sovereignty against demands made from 
outside its borders, the state is implicitly claiming that it has a right to be left 
alone and to do as it deems fit without externally imposed constraints. It is 
uncontroversial that sovereign states may do as they please without such 
constraints across some domain. States are institutions, which, from a normative 
point of view, are conventionally imagined as constituted by their citizens for 
the purpose of enabling and structuring practices of collective self-government. 
They are not only or even primarily globally authorized, decentralized 
administrators implementing international norms, even if they also have such a 
role to play as trustees of humanity.1 So, to the extent sovereign states are sites 
of collective self-government, there must exist some domain over which the 
national community is in authority and not subject to external constraints. The 
question, then, is how to determine the boundaries of this domain and thus the 
boundaries of a state’s right to be left alone. Here the principle of subsidiarity 
has an important role to play. 
At its core the idea of subsidiarity as a jurisdictional principle amounts to 
the proposition that the more local unit should have jurisdiction to regulate an 
issue, unless there are good reasons for the overarching, more central level to 
step in. Applied to the domestic jurisdiction of states in their relationship to 
international law, this translates into the claim that states should have the prima 
facie authority to determine what qualifies as a policy challenge and how to 
respond to it legally, unless there are good reasons for international law to 
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restrict what states may do and impose its own solutions. As a matter of positive 
international law, such an understanding of subsidiarity espouses the idea that 
sovereign states, as the primary building blocks of the international legal 
system, establish the institutional framework within which citizens practice 
collective self-determination. Reasons for the prima facie prioritization of states 
as sites for collective self-determination are numerous: they range from the 
virtues of relative decentralization of power to respect for local identities and 
preferences.2 There are also, of course, many reasons for legally restricting a 
state’s authority and empowering more centralized institutions, which this 
article will analyze. Nonetheless, any conclusive justification offered for 
centralizing regulatory authority must also reflect concerns for the advantages 
of local decisionmaking and strike a plausible balance between competing 
concerns. The principle of subsidiarity as a general architectural principle 
should be seen as structuring the process of justifying restrictions on state 
sovereignty by international law.3 
Questions of jurisdiction and potential violation of the principle of 
subsidiarity in international law can arise in a wide range of contexts. Such 
questions have traditionally been associated primarily with substantive concerns 
regarding allocation of power and authority: Are there, for example, compelling 
justifications for a specific regulatory issue to be addressed on a more central, 
rather than a more local level? Are there compelling reasons for the EU to 
strike a balance between the rights of those who want to smoke in public places 
and the right of those who wish to not be burdened by the effects others’ smoke 
in public, or should such a decision be left to the Member States?4 
Questions about the form of involvement by the local or central authority 
are also relevant to such an analysis. For example, provided that there are good 
reasons for international law to establish some protections for outsiders who 
face risks relating to the civil use of nuclear energy by neighboring states, 
should such protections be procedural only,5 or should international law 
establish minimum standards that any civilian’s use of nuclear energy must 
comply with? In such a scenario, is only the first approach compatible with 
subsidiarity, or is there a good justification for the more intrusive, minimum-
standard approach? 
 
 2.  For an overview of the range of concerns in play, see P. Berman, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously, 
94 Colum. L. Rev. 331 (1994); see also A. ESTELLA, THE EU PRINCIPLE OF SUBSIDIARITY AND ITS 
CRITIQUE (Oxford Univ. Press 2002). 
 3.  See generally Andreas Føllesdal, The Principle of Subsidiarity as a Constitutional Principle of 
International Law, 2 GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 37 (2013) (exploring various approaches toward 
framing states’ roles in international governance). 
 4.  See Mattias Kumm, Constitutionalizing Subsidiarity in Integrated Markets: The Case of 
Tobacco Regulation in the European Union, 12 EUR. L. J. 503, 506–24 (2006). 
 5.  These procedural forms of protection could take the form of requirements taking into account 
outside interests in cost-benefit analysis and allowing outsiders to participate in national administrative 
and judicial proceedings, for example. The Aarhus Convention takes such a procedural approach. See 
United Nations Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and 
Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, June 25, 1998, 2161 U.N.T.S. 447. 
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The principle of subsidiarity should also be understood to have a procedural 
dimension in addition to its substantive aspects. The specific procedure used to 
authoritatively decide policy questions relating to subsidiarity is often itself an 
issue that must be resolved with subsidiarity concerns in mind. Procedural 
subsidiarity concerns are weakest if the generation of an international legal 
obligation depends on that state’s consent, as is the case in the ordinary treaty-
making process. Nonetheless, even if a state specifically consents to such a 
restriction on its freedom of action, such a decision might still raise substantive 
subsidiarity concerns. Perhaps a Member State government only agreed to 
support, say, an EU measure prohibiting smoking in public spaces, because the 
political costs of imposing such a ban as a national measure would have been 
high or because the international process provided a welcome opportunity to 
impose a desired policy result on other states as well. Those reasons are not 
good reasons justifying the centralization of regulatory decisions. But even if 
substantive subsidiarity concerns do not disappear just because a government 
gives its consent, actual consent requirements still mitigate procedural 
subsidiarity concerns by giving a state the possibility to escape regulation by 
vetoing it. Subsidiarity concerns become stronger when the state is only one 
actor among others in the juris-generative process and when consent is no 
longer a necessary requirement for a state to be bound, as is the case, for 
example, with regard to customary international law (CIL) or majoritarian 
decisionmaking within treaty-based regimes. Subsidiarity concerns become 
stronger still when the role of states is even more marginal, as is the case, for 
example, with binding decisions of the United Nations Security Council for the 
great majority of states not represented in the Council. 
II 
SOVEREIGNTY AND THE BOUNDARIES OF STATE CONSENT: BETWEEN 
SUBSIDIARITY AND COSMOPOLITAN DUTY 
The focus of this article is the jurisdictional principle of subsidiarity as it 
relates to the consent requirement in international law. More specifically, the 
central question is: What is the domain over which states should be free to do 
what they like, subject only to obligations they have assumed voluntarily? Call 
this the “domain of subsidiarity.” Conversely, what lies outside of this domain? 
Under what circumstances is it justified for international law to impose legal 
obligations on sovereign states without their consent? Call this the “domain of 
cosmopolitan duty.” Under what circumstances is the fact that a state has not 
given its consent to a particular rule of international law compatible with the 
principle of subsidiarity properly understood? How should the boundaries 
between the domain of subsidiarity and the domain of cosmopolitan duty be 
drawn? Framing the issue in this way proves useful in determining the structural 
contours of a sovereign state’s right to be left alone. 
This is not only a question of political morality, useful to provide a critical 
perspective on existing international law; it is also a question relevant to the 
11-KUMM INCORPORATED (DO NOT DELETE) 5/17/2016  5:48 PM 
242 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 79:239 
interpretation and progressive development of international law. Questions of 
subsidiarity arise when a state finds itself with specific obligations under 
international law that it has not actually consented to. Most obviously, that is 
the case when a state is bound by norms that qualify as general principles of 
international law or CIL. But the issue is also relevant where states enter into 
treaties that establish institutions authorized to either create new obligations or 
to authoritatively interpret often highly abstract provisions of a treaty. In these 
cases, the link between these specific obligations and the consent of states can 
be highly attenuated. Because the connection between state consent and 
international legal obligations incumbent on the state is increasingly either 
nonexistent or attenuated,6 subsidiarity concerns are, unsurprisingly, emerging 
as a theme in international law.7 
This article explores the delimitation of the domain over which a state can 
plausibly invoke “sovereignty” and correctly insist that a matter falls 
“essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the state,”8 opposing the 
interpretation or progressive development of international legal norms, be it by 
way of CIL, general principles, or progressive interpretation of existing treaties. 
The idea of “sovereignty”9 and “essentially domestic jurisdiction of the state,”10 
as well as the test for finding general principles in international law or CIL or 
the appropriateness of a particular progressive development in international 
law, should incorporate considerations relating to subsidiarity. Interpretive 
questions relating to the content of such concepts, tests, and interpretations 
cannot plausibly be resolved by reference to conceptual analysis, canons of 
interpretation, or historical analysis alone. They should be resolved by 
arguments that take seriously a commitment to subsidiarity as a structural 
principle of the international order.11 To put it another way, if a legal 
requirement derived from a putative general principle of law or putative rule of 
CIL clearly violated the principle of subsidiarity, such a violation establishes a 
strong interpretative presumption that there is no such requirement as a matter 
of international law in the first place. Conversely, if claims about CIL or general 
principles of law are clearly justifiable under a proper understanding of 
subsidiarity as it applies to that context, claims invoking state sovereignty and 
matters falling under the “essentially domestic jurisdiction of the state”12 must 
be rejected as false. 
 
 6.  See Nico Krisch, The Decay of Consent: International Law in an Age of Global Public Goods, 
108 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 2–7 (2014).  
 7.  See generally Føllesdal, supra note 3. 
 8.  See U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 7. 
 9.  Id.  
 10.  Id.  
 11.  See Mattias Kumm, The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism: On the Relationship between 
Constitutionalism in and Beyond the State, in RULING THE WORLD: CONSTITUTIONALISM, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 258, 291 (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman 
eds., 2009). 
 12.  See U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 7. 
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This article does not describe in greater detail how the subsidiarity principle 
might infuse the structure of the relevant tests.13 It instead focuses on gaining a 
deeper understanding of how the subsidiarity requirement ought to be 
understood in normative terms as it relates to states and international law. 
Ultimately, this article seeks (1) to provide, at least in general terms, a clearer 
understanding of subsidiarity as the domain over which international law should 
not bind states without their specific consent, and (2) to define the limits of the 
domain of cosmopolitan duty under which the interpretation of international 
law should not be unduly restricted by concerns over the absence of state 
consent. 
Even framing the issue in this way means rejecting a widely held traditional 
view of the foundations of international law. Such a framing presupposes that 
state consent is not the foundation of international law. Or, if state consent is 
misleadingly said to be the foundation of international law, it is only 
foundational in the weak way that citizen consent is supposed by many political 
theorists to be the foundation of domestic law: only hypothetically and subject 
to a reasonableness requirement.14 Actual consent plays a more attenuated 
legitimating role, as decision-making authority is vested in majoritarian 
legislative, technocratic, administrative, or public-oriented judicial authorities. 
It is not only descriptively the case that considerable parts of international 
law are hard to reconstruct as being based on state consent. From a normative 
perspective too, state consent cannot plausibly be the foundation of 
international law. The legitimacy of a sovereign state is not self-standing. 
Rather, a sovereign state’s legitimacy and its legal order also depends on its 
integration into an international system whose purpose it is to first establish the 
conditions under which the exercise of state sovereignty is legitimate.15 
To substantiate that claim and to make substantial progress toward the 
delimitation of the domain of subsidiarity and the domain of cosmopolitan duty, 
this article suggests that drawing state boundaries and pursuing national policies 
generate justice-sensitive externalities that national law, no matter how 
democratic, cannot claim legitimate authority to assess. Rather, it is the purpose 
 
 13.  Questions include: Should the test operate independently of standard interpretative canons 
and tests? Should it be integrated in some way? If so, how exactly? For example, might considerations 
relating to subsidiarity be relevant for deciding between competing Treaty interpretations, because one 
impute respect for subsidiarity concerns to be reflected in the object and purpose of the Treaty under 
Art. 31 (1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties? Should subsidiarity concerns play role in 
determining how widespread or uniform state practice has to be to meet the test the test for 
establishing a rule of CIL? This would mean that the requirement would go up, if there are weighty 
subsidiarity concerns that speak against such a rule and, conversely, it would go down if there are 
strong subsidiarity related arguments in favor of adopting such a rule. For exploration of a flexible test 
that accommodates relevant normative concerns, see Anthea Roberts, Traditional and Modern 
Approaches to Customary International Law: A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 757 (2001).   
14.  For a classical discussion of the problems of consent based theories, see A. JOHN SIMMON, 
MORAL PRINCIPLES AND POLITICAL OBLIGATIONS 57–100 (1979). 
 15.  The following draws heavily on Mattias Kumm, The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism: 
An Integrated Conception of Public Law, 20 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 605 (2013). 
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of international law to authoritatively address problems of justice-sensitive 
externalities of state policies. International law seeks to create the conditions 
and define the domain over which states can legitimately claim sovereignty.16 
States have a standing duty to help create and sustain an international legal 
system that is equipped to fulfill that function.17 Only a cosmopolitan state—a 
state that incorporates and reflects in its constitutional structure and foreign 
policy the global legitimacy conditions for claims to sovereignty—is a legitimate 
state. But what does this mean specifically for determining whether a particular 
provision of international law violates the principle of subsidiarity by reference 
to this underlying purpose of international law? 
The fact of interdependence—that policies generate externalities on other 
states—has often been invoked as a generic argument in favor of international 
law.18 But as will become clear, interdependence and the more effective 
provision of public goods globally is not itself an argument against denying 
states the authority to determine for themselves whether and how to address 
issues relating to the provision of public goods.19 It may be true that 
international law is a means to reap the benefits of better cooperation and 
coordination between interdependent actors. But this assertion merely provides 
a functional argument for states to sign up for certain kinds of international 
cooperative endeavors. It does not, without further argument, undermine the 
claim that it is within a state’s authority to decide on how to address concerns 
surrounding the provision of public goods. 
The issue is different, however, when not just any externalities, but 
specifically justice-sensitive externalities, are in play. Part III discusses how the 
presence of justice-sensitive externalities undermines claims to legitimate 
national constitutional authority. Then, in part IV, this article then focuses 
more closely on three kinds of externalities, the normative concerns they raise, 
and the structure that international law needs to have to be able to address 
these concerns adequately. 
III 
WHY DO JUSTICE-RELEVANT NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES UNDERMINE 
CLAIMS TO LEGITIMATE AUTHORITY? 
Consider the following four examples as illustrations how a wide range of 
national policy choices implicates justice-sensitive externalities: First, a state 
decides to intervene militarily in another state; second, a state decides to 
embrace nuclear power stations not far from state borders and adopts nuclear 
safety standards that adjacent states claim are dangerously low; third, a state 
 
 16.  Id. at 612.  
 17.  Id.  
 18.  See, e.g., ERNST-ULRICH PETERSMANN, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW IN THE 21ST 
CENTURY: CONSTITUTIONAL PLURALISM AND MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE OF INTERDEPENDENT 
PUBLIC GOODS (2012). 
 19.  Contra id. 
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decides what level of carbon-dioxide emissions strikes the right balance 
between concerns about global warming and economic competitiveness; and 
fourth, a state decides how to allocate resources and sets priorities for law 
enforcement in clamping down on transnational organized crime. In all of these 
cases, outsiders may be affected in a way that raises concerns about whether 
their interests have been appropriately taken into account or whether others 
have unjustly burdened them. 
This article describes and closely analyzes different kinds of externalities 
and the justice-related problems they raise. State policies often have justice-
sensitive external effects. What follows from this fact is that a state has a duty to 
be aware of those externalities and to take them into consideration when 
conceiving and implementing national policies that avoid doing injustice. This 
requires state actors to conceive of themselves as something more than just 
participants in a practice of national self-government concerned with how 
public policies affect national constituents. Instead, when enacting policies that 
generate justice-sensitive negative externalities, states have a duty of justice to 
also act as trustees of humanity.20 For a state’s policies to be just, the state must 
adequately take into account the legitimate interests of affected outsiders. 
But that awareness alone is not enough. It is not sufficient for a state to 
attempt to do justice to outsiders by way of respecting their legitimate concerns 
in the policy-formation process. How justice concerns should be addressed is 
often subject to reasonable disagreement. States, even when following a 
constitutionally well-designed democratic policy process, lack the authority to 
determine unilaterally how reasonable disagreement should be resolved. The 
range of questions over which a state can plausibly claim legitimate authority is 
limited to questions that do not raise issues of justice-sensitive externalities. A 
sovereign state and its constitution established by “We the People” can only 
claim legitimate authority over a domain in which there are no justice-sensitive 
externalities. 
Instead, when justice-sensitive externalities are in play, a state is under a 
duty to support, help develop, and subject itself and its constitutional system to 
the authority of an appropriately structured system of international law.  
Consequently, given states’ limited authority to settle reasonable disagreements 
relating to justice-sensitive externalities, the central task and purpose of 
international law is to authoritatively settle these issues and thereby determine 
how claims of justice by outsiders limit what states may do. If a state does not 
accept the restriction of its authority and help support a constitutional system of 
international law that is adequately equipped to address these issues, it could 
overstretch its claim to legitimate authority and effectively insist on a 
relationship of domination regarding those who are externally affected. 
 
 20.  See generally Eyal Benvenisti, Sovereigns as Trustees of Humanity: On the Accountability of 
States to Foreign Stakeholders, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 295 (2013). See also Anne Peters, Humanity as the A 
and Ω of Sovereignty, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 513 (2009) (arguing that the concept of sovereignty should 
derive not from the state as such but from the rights and interests of humanity).  
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To understand why this overreaching would occur, it is useful to think about 
the grounds for legitimate authority in the domestic context. Under what might 
be called the “standard account” of legitimate authority within the 
constitutionalist tradition of the eighteenth century,21 the starting point is 
establishing just relations between free and equal persons—a task continually 
hampered by two problems: a motivational problem and an epistemic problem. 
Because of these problems, it is not sufficient for each actor to publicly profess 
allegiance to justice; something more is required—the subjection to 
constitutional authority. Why is that necessary? Why can’t all agents simply 
agree to do the right thing and to get along? 
First, there is the problem of motivation. By themselves, individual actors 
might not always be motivated to do what justice requires when they experience 
a conflict between what they want to do and what they recognize as an 
obligation of justice. The institutionalization of a constitutional system seeks to 
add nonmoral incentives—the threat of institutionalized sanctions of some 
kind—to support and stabilize justice-respecting behavior.22 The threat of 
sanctions has a double role in this regard. On the one hand, the addressee of the 
law has an additional incentive not to defect from a commitment to justice, in 
the face of what might appear to be other competing interests, because of the 
threat of sanctions. The threat of sanctions makes it easier to fight temptations 
and the desire to ignore internationally imposed requirements of justice. On the 
other hand, the threat of institutionalized sanctions provides an assurance of 
reciprocity. The threat assures that an actor seeking to comply with duties of 
justice will not end up the “sucker” when, in a reciprocal relationship, the other 
side takes advantage of justice-compliant behavior but refuses to comply with 
its obligations.23 
Second, there is an epistemic problem. Even assuming that all relevant 
actors are motivated in the right way, they might still disagree about what 
justice actually requires. No procedure guarantees the agreement of well-
informed and appropriately disposed intelligent actors, even regarding specific 
questions of justice. Given disagreement over questions of justice, appropriately 
structured procedures are necessary to authoritatively determine what claims of 
justice are to be recognized as valid. The alternative would be to have the more 
powerful side dictate and enforce its conception of justice against the weaker 
side. That, however, would be a form of domination. It would privilege one side 
over the other without good reason.24 The actors are, therefore, under an 
 
 21.  The following argument roughly tracks traditional Kantian arguments. For contemporary 
discussions of reasonable disagreement and its connection to the establishment of legitimate authority, 
see SAMANTHA BESSON, THE MORALITY OF CONFLICT: REASONABLE DISAGREEMENT AND THE 
LAW (2005) and JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT (1999). 
 22.  See BESSON, supra note 20; WALDRON, supra note 20. 
 23.  Given the uneven role that sanctioning illegal behavior plays in international law, the weight of 
this argument will depend on the nature of the sanctioning regime in place in a particular regulatory 
domain.  
 24.  If constitutionalism is connected to the idea that justice requires the absence of domination, 
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obligation to establish and subject themselves to a system of constitutional 
authority that provides appropriately impartial and participatory procedures to 
contest existing conditions and practices, that resolves disagreements, and that 
ensures that the results are reasonable and justifiable to all concerned. These, in 
a highly stylized form, are some of the key steps for the justification of 
legitimate authority within the liberal, democratic–constitutionalist tradition. 
If the arguments relating to justice-sensitive externalities that are standard 
fare in philosophical accounts of the duty of individuals to help establish and 
subject themselves to appropriately structured constitutional authority on the 
state level are correct, the problem replicates itself in the relationship between 
states.25 Questions of justice also arise between independent self-governing 
entities and the individuals that comprise them. These questions often become 
contentious because of the interplay between mixed motivations and epistemic 
problems, leading to disagreement and distrust. The history of foreign policy—
even of powerful liberal democracies—provides ample illustrations of disregard 
and bias against outside interests. Even if liberal democracies were to do a 
better job of taking into account those interests than other forms of 
government,26 the problem of bias does not disappear. Given that statesmen 
have an incentive to focus on the concerns of national constituents, the 
structural bias of national political processes regarding questions of justice-
sensitive externalities is obvious enough. Furthermore, even though states are 
obligated to do justice with regard to individuals whether or not there are 
appropriate assurances of reciprocity,27 many obligations under international 
law exist subject only to the condition of reciprocal compliance.28 
Furthermore, the kinds of justice questions that arise in relation to negative 
externalities of national policies are clearly issues upon which reasonable 
disagreement often exists. Even if reasonable people might agree that the 
appropriation of territory by way of military force is a violation of another 
sovereign’s right, what kind of measures may be used to retaliate against 
violations of legal obligations by another state? What kind of weapons may a 
 
then reasons simply invoking facts about power relationships are never good reasons, and both sides 
claim to have justice on their side. For theories that link the constitutionalist tradition to the idea of 
justice as nondomination, see RAINER FORST, THE RIGHT TO JUSTIFICATION (2011) and PHILIP 
PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT (Oxford Univ. Press 1999).  
 25.  For the first development of this, see IMMANUEL KANT, PERPETUAL PEACE 128–36 (M. 
Campbell Smith trans., 1917) (1795). 
 26.  It is reasonably well established that democracies tend not to go to war with each other. See 
generally STEVEN PINKER, THE BETTER ANGELS OF OUR NATURE: WHY VIOLENCE HAS DECLINED 
(2011) (providing an overview of the debate and literature relating to the “Democratic Peace” thesis). 
Moreover, there seems to be a correlation between liberal democracies, opening up markets to 
participate in the global economy, and the degree of multilateral legal integration as reflected in 
membership in international institutions. Id. 
 27.  This is also recognized under positive international law with regard to certain obligations. See, 
e.g., G.A. Res. 56/83, art. 50, annex, Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (Dec. 
12, 2001).  
 28.  In case of noncompliance, a state can take countermeasures in the form of nonperformance of 
its obligations vis-à-vis the noncompliant state. See, e.g., id. arts. 49–53. 
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state seek to acquire? What kind of national counterterrorism efforts are 
minimally necessary to ensure that a state does not unwillingly become a safe 
haven for international terrorists committing violence on the territory of 
another state? What level of pollution of a river is acceptable upstream, given 
cross-border downstream usage? What levels of carbon-dioxide emissions are 
acceptable in light of the consequences of global warming? These kinds of 
questions give rise to debates in which actors might reasonably disagree about 
what exactly justice requires in a given context. 
Because of the pervasiveness of reasonable disagreement, these are not the 
kinds of issues over which a state’s constitutional system, no matter how 
internally democratic, can claim legitimate constitutional authority. Claiming 
authority to resolve questions of justice concerning outsiders, who by definition 
have no equal standing in the domestic policy-formation process, is an act of 
domination. The enforcement of a conception of justice by a powerful actor or a 
hegemonic coalition of actors against others making competing claims is an act 
of domination if those hegemonic actors refuse to subject themselves to an 
impartial procedure providing equal participatory opportunities for those 
whose reasonable justice claims are implicated. With regard to issues 
concerning justice-sensitive externalities, each state is under a standing 
obligation to support, help further develop, and subject itself to a constitutional 
system of international law that is equipped to authoritatively address these 
issues. Such a system would have to provide an impartial and appropriately 
participatory procedure to resolve these issues in a way that is reasonable and 
justifiable to all concerned. The point of such a system of international law is to 
define the domain over which states can legitimately exercise sovereignty and 
for which “We the People” can claim self-governing constitutional authority. 
IV 
THREE KINDS OF EXTERNALITIES 
The centrality of justice-sensitive externalities in understanding both the 
limits of national constitutional authority and the purpose of international law 
warrants a closer analysis of the concept and its main practical manifestations. 
More specifically, this article distinguishes three kinds of externalities. Each 
type of externality raises distinct normative concerns and accounts for specific 
structural features of international law. Here, the article describes these 
externalities, the kinds of justice concerns they raise, and the basic features that 
international law must have to adequately address them. 
A. Structural Externalities: Establishment of Borders 
The first kind of justice-sensitive negative externality is structural. It is 
linked to the fact that a people governing itself within the institutional 
framework of the state requires the establishment of borders. The claim to self-
government—or, using the territory within the state borders as is deemed 
desirable by “We the People” organizing their lives together—has an external 
11-KUMM INCORPORATED (DO NOT DELETE) 5/17/2016  5:48 PM 
No. 2 2016] SOVEREIGNTY AND THE RIGHT TO BE LEFT ALONE 249 
corollary in the claim to a collective right to exclude others from crossing 
national borders and entering. States generally claim a sovereign right to freely 
determine who they let in or refuse. Importantly, this sovereign right restricts 
the liberty of those intending to cross a state boundary and seeking to move to 
the territory of another state, whether to find a better life, or for any other 
reason. How can such exclusion be justified?29 What justifies the state’s coercive 
force that someone might encounter at the border when they seek to enter 
without meeting established national requirements? 
The claim to sovereignty over territory by “We the People” can be, and has 
been, analogized to the claims to property over land by individuals in a 
domestic society. In both cases, the claim of the rights-holders is that they 
should be able to use land and to exclude all others as they deem fit. Generally, 
arguments in favor of a world divided into distinct and separate sovereign states 
focus on an array of benefits for assigning special responsibility to a group of 
persons to a specific piece of land connected to the cultural production of 
meaning, creation of social trust, and solidarity.30 But any successful justification 
for a right to exclude outsiders seeking entry has to satisfy some additional 
conditions. To take the example of a strong defender of property rights, even 
John Locke insisted that the right was subject to the proviso that there has to be 
“enough and as good left in common for others.”31 Even though every 
appropriation of property is a diminution of another’s rights to it, it is justifiable 
so long as it does not make any party worse off than they would have been 
without the possibility of such appropriation. The standard of “as good” in the 
context of claiming exclusion from territorially-based practices of self-
 
 29.  This issue has spurred a rich literature in recent years. See generally JOSEPH CARENS, THE 
ETHICS OF IMMIGRATION (2013)(Discussing a variety of justifications and concluding that none of 
them can justify the actual exclusionary practices states tend to engage in); AYELET SHACHAR, THE 
BIRTHRIGHT LOTTERY: CITIZENSHIP AND GLOBAL INEQUALITY (2009) (arguing that birthright 
citizenship can be understood as a type of property inheritance); David Miller, Immigrants, Nations, 
and Citizenship, 16 J. POL. PHIL. 371 (2008) (outlining the various incentives that impact nation 
formation); Mathias Risse, On the Morality of Immigration, 22 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 25 (2008) (arguing 
that immigration controls are frequently used as mechanisms to limit access to resources).  
 30.  See generally JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES (1999) (arguing for gains generated from a 
formation of society as a Society of Peoples); DAVID MILLER, ON NATIONALITY (1995) (suggesting 
the benefits of nationalism as a basis of state organization). 
 31.  ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 175 (1974). This Lockean Proviso was 
reintroduced into the modern debate about the original appropriation of property by Nozick’s work 
and refers to John Locke’s argument in the Second Treatise of Government that the recognition of a 
right to appropriation of property did not do injustice to others now precluded from making use of the 
appropriated land. Id. at 174–82. Locke argues as follows:  
Nor was this appropriation of any parcel of land, by improving it, any prejudice to any other 
man, since there was still enough, and as good left; and more than the yet un-provided could 
use. So that, in effect, there was never the less left for others because of his enclosure for 
himself: for he that leaves as much as another can make use of, does as good as take nothing at 
all. No body could think himself injured by the drinking of another man, though he took a 
good draught, who had a whole river of the same water left him to quench his thirst: and the 
case of land and water, where there is enough of both, is perfectly the same. 
JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 33 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Hackett Publishing 
Co. 1980) (1690). 
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government requires that the person denied entry must have access to the 
territory of a state where, at the very least, his or her rights are not violated in a 
serious way. That is, in order to justify excluding a person from a state, that 
person must have access to some other state that does not violate his or her 
rights. Anything else could not plausibly qualify as “as good” in the relevant 
sense. If State A meets this requirement, it succeeds in creating the 
preconditions for State B’s legitimate assertion of its right to exclude individuals 
from State A seeking entry into State B. When, in a concrete situation, an 
individual finds herself subject to a state that clearly does not fulfill its sovereign 
obligations to respect, protect, and guarantee her rights, and she decides to 
exercise her right to exit that state and to seek entry elsewhere, the latter state 
lacks clear justifications for excluding her entry. 
Thinking about borders and the right to exclude along these lines helps to 
highlight the importance of two core features of international law. On the one 
hand, international law seeks to create the conditions for the legitimate exercise 
of the right of a sovereign to exclude. All states are required by international 
law to respect, protect, and fulfill the human rights of those subject to their 
jurisdiction.32 On the other hand, international law limits the sovereign right to 
exclude in cases where these conditions are not met, particularly in the case of 
refugees.33 This way of conceiving of international human rights law provides a 
hard ground for why international law concerns itself with how states relate to 
their citizens and why a great deal of human rights law is binding on states 
whether or not they have specifically signed and ratified human rights treaties.34 
Solidarity with all members of the human community is not the only reason for 
states to be concerned that human rights are respected everywhere.35 It is also in 
 
 32.  Maria Green, What We Talk about When We Talk about Indicators: Current Approaches to 
Human Rights Measurement, 24 HUM. RTS. Q. 1062, 1071 (2001).  
 33.  See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 1, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137. 
amended by the 1967 Protocol of United Nation Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 
(defining a refugee as a person who “owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of 
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside of his 
country of nationality and is unable or, owing to fear, is unwilling to avail himself to the protection of 
that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual 
residence . . . is unable or, owing to fear, is unwilling to return to it”).  
 34.  On the one hand this means that international human rights law is best interpreted as binding 
all states, irrespective of whether they ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, either because human rights 
constitute general principles of law or because they qualify as CIL or, most plausibly, some 
combination of both. An open question is whether states are under a duty to subject themselves to 
some form of compulsory international human rights adjudication, such as it exists in the context of the 
European Court of Human Rights or the Inter-American Court of Human rights. For an argument that 
there is such a duty, see generally ALON HAREL, WHY LAW MATTERS 16–42 (2014). Also of central 
importance are the related questions of on what grounds and to what extent international human rights 
courts should grant deference to national institutions by way of recognizing a “margin of appreciation.” 
For a critical account, see George Letsas, Two Concepts of the Margin of Appreciation, 26 OXFORD J. 
LEGAL STUD. 705 (2006). The answers to these questions require arguments that go beyond the scope 
of this article. 
 35.  Other reasons states might have for internationally entrenching human rights protection are 
self-interested. They include, but are not limited to, preventing refugee flows associated with human 
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the states’ interest to ensure the necessary preconditions for the justifiability of 
their national exclusionary practices. 
B. Justice-Sensitive Externalities of National Policy 
Beside the fact that states establish borders and claim the right to exclude, 
there are justice-relevant externalities related to states implementing national 
policies, burdening outsiders with harms, and threatening harm or risks. These 
externalities range from the obvious to the subtle. On the obvious end of the 
spectrum, some states embrace an aggressive, expansionist foreign policy. An 
imperial policy of domination and expansion subverting the political and 
territorial independence of neighbors is obviously not justified, even when such 
a policy enjoys widespread democratic support in the aggressor state and that 
state has a well-structured national constitutional system. 
Less obvious examples raise significantly more pervasive concerns and do 
not concern foreign policy directly. Consider the establishment of nuclear 
power plants in states with insufficient safety standards near international 
borders. Or consider lax carbon-dioxide emission standards contributing to 
global warming but the detrimental effects of which might be moderate in the 
polluting jurisdiction, yet might nonetheless lead to severe droughts causing 
starvation, severe flooding resulting in the necessity to relocate millions, or even 
the wholesale sinking of island–states elsewhere. Less dramatically, imagine an 
upriver riparian state polluting a river to such an extent that it imposes severe 
harms downstream within the territory of the downriver state. 
Finally, and more subtly, extraterritorial effects raising justice concerns may 
also be connected to states failing to exercise their responsibility to prevent 
their territory from being used as a base to organize, plan, and inflict harm in 
other jurisdictions by other actors. Justice concerns are not merely raised by 
negative externalities of state action, but also by omissions that result in the 
failure to realize positive externalities when the state has a responsibility to act. 
Here, the issues raised include failing to undertake adequate counterterrorism 
efforts by effectively granting safe harbor to terrorist organizations or failing to 
crack down on other forms of organized crime with potential cross-border 
effects. 
Given that these are areas in which states lack legitimate authority to 
effectively control what may or may not be done, no injustice is done to states 
when they are subjected to legal obligations without having consented to them. 
On the contrary, deep legitimacy questions arise when individual states have 
the capacity to effectively veto the emergence of universally binding obligations 
in contexts where the behavior of an individual state raises justice-sensitive 
externality concerns. Thankfully, international law has developed capacities to 
 
rights violations of other states, or locking in human rights domestically, which makes it more difficult 
for new rights-averse political movements to overthrow the old order. For the latter argument see 
Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe, 
54 INT’L ORG. 217 (2000).  
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generate universally binding legal obligations that overcome the blocking power 
of individual states that refuse to give their consent. Regarding the use of force 
and questions of peace and security, the United Nations Security Council has 
interpreted its competencies broadly, and functions (albeit often 
unsatisfactorily) as a world legislator operating by qualified majority vote in 
areas concerning threats to international peace and security.36 
Furthermore, in many cases involving these types of concerns,37 
international courts and tribunals have interpreted the requirements for CIL in 
a way that reflects the underlying purpose of international law. When justice-
sensitive externalities are in play, judges tend to interpret the requirements of 
CIL38 as if these requirements reflect the idea of a decentralized, informal, 
quasi-legislative, qualified-majoritarian process—not the idea of implied 
consent by states.39 Here, the fact that a state can find itself subject to 
international legal obligations without its consent presents no problem as a 
matter of principle. And here, the only issue concerns the question whether the 
process by which new legal obligations are generated is fair and allows for 
adequate participatory opportunities by all states. How to interpret the 
requirements for CIL in a way that is responsive to requirements of procedural 
fairness raises interesting questions. But the real problem is the extent to which 
powerful states remain in a position to veto juris-generative efforts. Requiring 
consent in these contexts is international law’s equivalent of Lochnerism40 in 
U.S. constitutional law: misguided assertions that majoritarian processes could 
not create legitimate obligations absent the consent of the parties on whom 
burdens are imposed. The veto claimed and exercised by the five permanent 
members in the Security Council raises more legitimacy issues than any erosion 
of the consent requirement. To address these concerns, creative interpretive 
proposals aimed at qualifying the veto right and narrowing the capacity of 
 
 36.  See Stefan Talmon, The Security Council as World Legislature, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 175, 175 
(2005).  
 37.  See Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary 
International Law: A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 757, 772–74 (2001) (arguing that the standards 
for determining whether CIL exists with regard to a particular issue might be sensitive to the particular 
function that international law needs to fulfill in the respective area). For similar ideas focused on the 
role of national courts engaging international law more generally, see Eyal Benvenisti, Reclaiming 
Democracy: The Strategic Uses of Foreign and International Law by National Courts, 102 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 241 (2008). 
 38.  See supra text accompanying notes 8–9. 
 39.  The legitimating idea of consent of states in international law could be analogized to the idea 
of consent in domestic constitutional theory. Individuals are subject to the laws of the land, whether or 
not they have explicitly or implicitly consented to them. Consent is only relevant in the sense that 
liberal political philosophy refers to the idea of “reasonable consent,” which remains an operative ideal 
standard for assessing claims of justice. Actual consent matters only in a limited domain—the domain 
of private law contracts—where individuals are in authority and can control the obligations they have 
with regard to others. 
 40.  See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 56 (1905) (holding that a New York law limiting the 
number of hours a baker could work was an arbitrary interference with the right and liberty of the 
individual to contract; instead of legislative majoritarian intervention, only specific consent of the 
parties could justify such restrictions).  
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individual states to block otherwise universally binding decisions point in the 
right direction.41 
C. Externalities of National Policies That Do Not Raise Justice Concerns 
All of the above examples describe externalities that raise justice concerns. 
A wide range of externalities, however, do not.42 Outsiders have no claim of 
justice against a state’s political community that fails to take into account their 
well-being when making a decision that has external effects. Outsiders have a 
right not to be unjustly harmed by a state, but those governing themselves 
within the framework of the state have a right not to be required to make 
themselves a mere instrument of the well-being of others. Much could be said 
about why this is so and what exactly follows from this,43 but here it must suffice 
to put forward a couple of basic distinctions and examples for illustrative 
purposes. 
First, the failure to realize positive externalities—due to an omission by a 
state—is a justice concern only in cases where there is a positive duty of justice 
for the state to act. A state is under a positive duty, for example, to ensure there 
are no harms emanating from its territory.44 Here, the relevant externalities 
concern justice claims by outsiders.45 
There is no general duty of a state, however, to take into account and 
further the welfare of outsiders in the same way it would insiders. When 
debating whether more money should be spent on social security to strengthen 
those that are weakest in society, it is not plausible to insist that money has to 
be spent to raise the level of those worst off globally up to that of those worst 
off nationally. It does not constitute unjustified discrimination that state social-
security benefits are not available to every person on the globe. Nor does state 
action raise justice concerns by adopting a national economic policy that is 
focused on increasing national welfare, but that has a welfare reducing global 
effect. States are not under a general duty to ensure that outsiders benefit as 
much from state policies as nationals; they are trustees of humanity only to the 
extent that outsiders can make plausible claims of justice that a state is required 
 
 41.  See, e.g., Peters, supra note 20, at 539–40 (arguing that a veto cast under certain circumstances 
should be regarded as null and void). 
 42.  For an account of the different normative significance of different kinds of effects that informs 
the distinction between justice-sensitive externalities and non-justice-sensitive externalities, see Alec 
Walen, Transcending the Means Principle, 33 LAW AND PHIL. 427–64 (2014).  
 43.  For a more fully developed moral theory that makes sense of these basic non-utilitarian 
intuitions, see id. For a discussion of the role of deontological restrictions in various areas of the law, 
see generally Mattias Kumm & Alec D. Walen, Human Dignity and Proportionality: Deontic Pluralism 
in Balancing, in PROPORTIONALITY AND THE RULE OF LAW 67–89 (Grant Huscroft, Bradley Miller & 
Gregoire Webber eds., 2014). 
 44.  For a good overview on the way this principle operates in the area of environmental 
international law, see generally JULIO BARBOZA, THE ENVIRONMENT, RISK AND LIABILITY IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2011). 
 45.  This is also true when those harms are brought about not directly by state action, but by 
private actors such as terrorists or other forms of organized crime. 
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to respect. Beyond that, states have special obligations toward only their own 
citizens and states rightly make their citizens’ well-being the paramount 
concern. 
Second, even the infliction of negative externalities does not always 
constitute a justice-sensitive externality.46 There is no injustice done to 
outsiders, for example, when a state engages in protectionist policies and denies 
or prohibitively taxes market access of certain goods and services. There is no 
legitimate justice claim against one political community for failing to realize 
economic benefits for another political community. Even if a state initially 
opened its borders for certain trades and later unilaterally closed them again, 
thus imposing severe losses on outside traders who had relied on making such 
trades, these are not negative externalities that raise justice concerns. Just like a 
shopkeeper has no claim of justice against a patron who decides to no longer 
patronize his shop, the importer has no claim to justice against a state deciding 
to close its borders to a certain kind of trade. In these types of cases, the actions 
of one state merely change the circumstances for another state or individual.47 
When there is a high level of interdependence—situations in which subjects 
mutually find themselves subjected to the infliction of externalities by 
outsiders—states have an interest in coordinating policies and cooperating with 
one another to maximize the welfare of their constituents and ensure Pareto-
optimal policies. This is what most countries have done across a wide range of 
goods and services to mutually profit from more open markets within the 
context of the World Trade Organization or other regional trade regimes. Once 
a country has legally committed itself, bilaterally or multilaterally, to grant 
access to certain goods and services, the situation changes. In such a context, the 
negative externalities connected to a failure to comply with contractual 
obligations generally constitute justice-relevant harms. But they do so only 
because of violations of agreed commitments and not independently from such 
commitments. In such a context, voluntary legal commitments are constitutive of 
plausible justice claims. 
This, then, is the proper domain of consent-based interactional treaty law. 
Here, treaties are the functional equivalent of private-law contracts in domestic 
law. Consent is not the foundation of international law, but there is a domain in 
which sovereign states can claim to be free to do as they deem fit and subject 
themselves only to obligations they have freely accepted. There is a domain in 
which consent is rightly regarded as constitutive of legal obligations. This is the 
domain over which a sovereign has authority. 
 
 
 46.  Walen, supra note 42, at 427–64.  
 47.  See, e.g., ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, FORCE AND FREEDOM: KANT’S LEGAL AND POLITICAL 
PHILOSOPHY 267–300 (2009).  
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D. Beyond Harm? Tortious Complicity, Consent-Based Social Practices and 
Good Samaritan Duties 
Critics may suggest that the account provided so far overstates the scope of 
the domain of subsidiarity. They might ask: Is the domain of cosmopolitan duty 
appropriately circumscribed by the idea of justice-sensitive externalities or 
harms? Doesn’t this account complacently ignore deep global injustices? 
Shouldn’t cosmopolitan duties also include robust duties of redistributive 
justice? 
Strong cosmopolitan redistributive theories of social justice that place no 
significance on the fact that the world is divided up into states are difficult to 
square with the premises of the argument presented here. But those theories 
are not only unhelpful for the purposes of critically reconstructing existing 
international law; they are also not persuasive in moral terms. The account 
provided here does not complacently normalize deep injustices. Rather, it 
provides the basis for a different and arguably more persuasive account of 
exactly wherein the injustices lie. Here it must suffice to make three points.48 
A justice-sensitive externality account has significant reach. A great deal of 
misery and extreme poverty in the world is connected to corrupt, despotic, and 
kleptocratic governments that ruin the life prospects of the citizens who, by 
virtue of having been born in that place, happen to have drawn the short straw 
in the birthright lottery. On the one hand, the existence of such deficient 
government structures might be understood as the legacy of the historical 
injustice of colonialism,49 raising the questions of whether and to what extent ex-
colonial powers ought to face up to compensatory claims. But such claims are 
burdened with the problem of responsibility allocation in the context of a long 
chain of causal events, as well as pragmatic concerns relating to closure and the 
passage of time. 
More promising is a perspective focused on the present: when kleptocratic 
despots loot, ravage, and pillage their country for their own purposes, they 
generally do so with the help of weapons bought from developed countries, with  
expertise and license fees provided by helpful multinational companies, all the 
while receiving symbolic validation and diplomatic recognition and protection 
under international law. In that sense, developed countries are invariably 
complicit in the misery that characterizes many despotically-run or failing 
states, whose citizens are condemned to live in misery.50 This complicity in 
 
 48.  For an excellent overview of debates on global distributive justice, see Michael Blake & 
Patrick Taylor Smith, International Distributive Justice, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2015), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/ 
international-justice/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2015). 
 49.  For an overview of the discussion on the relevance of colonialism for different kind of state 
failures, see James Mayall, The Legacy of Colonialism, in MAKING STATES WORK: STATE FAILURE 
AND THE CRISIS OF GOVERNANCE 36 (Simon Chesterman, Michael Ignatieff & Ramesh Thakur eds., 
2005). 
 50.   For an extensive analysis of these relationships in the context of oil, see LEIF WENAR, BLOOD 
OIL: TYRANTS, VIOLENCE AND THE RULES THAT RUN THE WORLD (2015). 
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injustice is just another justice-sensitive externality of state behavior. Such 
complicity might plausibly give rise to justified demands of tortious liability 
against states that either provide regimes with weapons or permit multinational 
companies to cooperate with and finance the organized criminals who have 
happened to have captured the levers of power. Arguably one of the scandals of 
existing international law is the extent to which complicit states are shielded 
from accountability under prevailing rules of state responsibility.51 Overhauling 
those rules is likely to not only have greater ameliorative impact; it would also 
address, more directly than alternative proposals, exactly what is unjust about 
present relationships. 
Furthermore, treaties that establish long-term, relatively encompassing 
cooperative endeavors arguably create further duties of justice among the 
participants—the duty to share the benefits of the joint cooperative endeavor 
fairly. What justice in this sense requires depends to some extent on the 
structure of the practice that states have consented to be part of. Long-term and 
sufficiently deep forms of cooperation, even when they are entered into 
voluntarily, are just and fair only if they ensure that the cooperative benefit is 
shared fairly by all participants.52 Questions as to the implications for 
redistributive claims among states participating in the basic global economic 
structures established by the World Trade Organization, the International 
Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and investment protection regimes are 
beyond the scope of the article. Here it must suffice to point out that it is 
conceptually possible for long-term, treaty-based cooperation to provide the 
grounds for further claims of distributive justice. Here, too, there is no 
stipulation of an abstract cosmopolitan duty to redistribute. Claims of justice 
attach to structures of social cooperation grounded in consent.53 
Finally, beyond tortious liability and duties to fairly share the benefits of 
cooperative endeavors, there may well be Good Samaritan duties that apply to 
well-off states in their relationships with states burdened by unfavorable 
conditions. Nothing in the framework developed here precludes the duty to 
assist other peoples living under unfavorable conditions.54 But this residual duty 
will rarely ground an obligation for which there are not independent moral 
grounds justified within the developed framework, which grounds duties that 
 
51. States are responsible for assisting another state in committing an internationally wrongful act only 
if they do so with knowledge of the circumstances of the internationally wrongful act. Int’l L. Comm’n, 
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, art. 16, Nov. 2001, Supp. No. 
10 (A/56/10), ch. IV.E.1, http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ddb8f804.html. In other words, delivering 
weapons to dictators only engages international responsibility if it can be proven that the delivering 
state knew of the concrete atrocities for which those weapons would later be used. For an analysis of 
the current law, see HELMUT PHILIPP AUST, COMPLICITY AND STATE RESPONSIBILITY (2011). 
 52.  Andrea Sangiovanni, Global Justice, Reciprocity, and the State, 35 PHIL. & PUB. AFF., Winter 
2007, at 3, 21.  
 53.  In that sense, notwithstanding the quite different focus of the article, it is perfectly compatible 
with basic positions such as those advocated, for example, by Thomas Pogge, ¿Qué Es La Jusiticia 
Global? [What is Global Justice?], 10 REVISTA DE ECONOMÍA INSTITUCIONAL, no. 19, 2008, at 99.  
 54.  See RAWLS, supra note 30.  
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generally go considerably further than Good Samaritan duties in the Rawlsian 
tradition plausibly might. If that is true, Good Samaritan duties are mostly 
distractions in debates about cosmopolitan duty. Talk of solidarity tends to 
detract from the fact that rich and powerful states bear considerable 
responsibility for many of the most atrocious forms of contemporary injustice 
and depravation. 
V 
CONCLUSION 
This article addresses the delimitation between the domain of subsidiarity—
the domain over which states should be free to do as they deem fit, subject only 
to obligations they have actually consented to—and the domain of 
cosmopolitan duty—the domain over which international law can plausibly 
claim authority over a state, whether or not it has consented to a particular 
obligation. By discussing the concerns that govern the delimitation of these 
domains, the article addresses key issues relating to the limits of sovereignty 
understood as a right to be left alone. The concept of justice-sensitive 
externalities is critical for this discussion. The article differentiates between 
different kinds of justice-sensitive externalities, distinguishes justice-sensitive 
externalities from externalities that are not justice-sensitive, and discusses how 
these externalities matter. The article does not purport to resolve all baseline 
issues; it only begins to discuss implications that are to be drawn from the 
analysis for the reconstruction or critique of some central international law 
doctrines. The contribution of the article, then, is primarily structural: it clarifies 
the range of reasons that are relevant for delimiting the domain of subsidiarity. 
And it clarifies how the role of consent differs across different subject-matter 
areas, depending on the kind of externalities implicated. The account provided 
here explains and justifies why state consent has a different role to play in trade 
law, for example, than in human rights or law relating to the use of force. The 
former are structurally more closely aligned with considerations that do not 
concern justice-sensitive externalities and thus fall under the domain of 
subsidiarity, whereas the latter is aligned with justice-sensitive concerns and 
thus falls in the domain of cosmopolitan duty. 
Subsidiarity issues arise also within the domain of cosmopolitan duty. Saying 
that it is not a violation of subsidiarity for international law to bind a state 
without its consent within the domain of cosmopolitan duty does not settle the 
question of whether the concrete international obligation imposed on the state 
is appropriately responsive to subsidiarity concerns. When State A decides to 
build a nuclear energy plant near the border to State B, and the citizens of State 
B worry about inadequate safety standards, the existence of justice-sensitive 
externalities means that no injustice is done to State A were it to confront 
international legal rules governing this situation that it had not consented to.  
But the legal rules it confronts can be more or less intrusive. On the one 
hand, such rules may be procedural only. The rules might require the state to 
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take into account the interests of affected citizens in State B on equal terms 
when using cost-benefit analysis to make the locational decision. The rules may 
also require that State A permit the participation of affected persons in State B 
on equal terms.55 On the other hand, international rules might require that the 
nuclear power plant meet substantive standards defined, say, by the 
International Atomic Energy Agency. Whether one kind of approach is 
preferable over another requires balancing the relevant competing concerns. 
The principle of subsidiarity, then, would continue to structure discussions 
among various approaches even within the domain of cosmopolitan duty. But 
given that the general issue is one falling within the domain of cosmopolitan 
duty, the remaining substantive subsidiarity issue is not one that needs the 
consent of the affected state to be legitimate. Whatever a state’s view on what 
the correct, subsidiarity-sensitive regulatory approach might be, the state 
generally ought to respect how international law settles the issue. 
Conversely, even when a state explicitly gives its consent to a treaty, the 
question remains whether the specific content of the international obligation it 
has consented to is compatible with a commitment to subsidiarity. Imagine that 
a state delegates decisionmaking to an international organization, empowering 
it to make all rules it deems fitting and proper for the regulation of a common 
market, without tying that authorization to subsidiarity requirements. If that 
international body then proceeds to enact rules relating to smoking in public 
spaces or other cases in which there is no discernible reason for international 
rather than national regulation, then such regulation is not compatible with the 
principle of subsidiarity and can be criticized as such. The fact that consent was 
granted does not mean that such a measure cannot be criticized as a violation of 
the principle of subsidiarity. But if the organization is acting within its delegated 
powers, the state cannot complain that the organization is not acting within its 
authority, because such authority had been specifically granted. The state can 
only articulate its critique as one of policy, not as a critique of the international 
institution’s authority. If, on the other hand, international law purported to 
regulate questions that fall within the domain of subsidiarity without 
authorization by the state, that state would act within its authority to determine 
that such international legal rules are not only bad policy, but are ultra vires and 
outside of the authority of international law. 
 
 
 55.  This is the approach taken, for example, by the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, 
Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters of the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), June 25, 1998, 2161 U.N.T.S. 447.  
